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ABSTRACT
This thesis traces the events that led to the successful use of 
the technique of inoculation to prevent the outbreak of smallpox 
epidemics in the Continental Army during the Revolutionary War. It 
also provides an insight into the leadership role played by General 
Washington in bringing about the policy of inoculation for the 
soldiers in his command.
Ever since the smallpox virus was introduced to the North 
American continent by the European explorers and settlers in the 
colonial period, there had been controversy over the desirability of 
inoculation as a means of controlling the disease. It was known, of 
course, that if a victim recovered from an attack of smallpox he or 
she was assured of lifetime immunity. The controversy developed over 
the risks involved in deliberately spreading the infection. Since 
most people were afraid of contracting the deadly smallpox in any 
form, the procedure of inoculation remained under a cloud. In many of 
the colonies, inoculation was officially banned.
The Revolutionary War helped bring the inoculation controversy to 
a head. Smallpox epidemics debilitated the ranks of the Continental 
Army in the Canadian campaign of 1775-6. As a result, General 
Washington made the calculated decision to inoculate all of his troops 
despite the risk. Fortunately, his judgment proved sound. From 1777 
onwards, as a result of a mandatory program of inoculation, the 
smallpox virus was virtually eradicated as a threat to the health of 
the Continental Army.
v
SMALLPOX, THE CONTINENTAL ARMY, AND GENERAL WASHINGTON
INTRODUCTION
"The Smallpox is a more terrible Enemy than the British Troops."
(Governor Jonathan Trumbull of 
Connecticut to John Hancock, 
president of the Continental 
Congress in Philadelphia, July 
5, 1776.)
Smallpox is believed to have originated in Africa, tracing back 
as far as 10,000 B.C. From there it was carried by infected men, 
women, and children to the Middle East, Europe, Asia, and the 
Americas. For centuries, no one understood the nature of the disease 
and there was no known cure. It struck young and old, rich and poor, 
every color and race alike. It was extremely contagious and the 
infection was thought to have been spread by physical contact with 
contaminated persons or objects.
Epidemics of smallpox would appear periodically and unannounced. 
In some of the larger population centers, it was endemic and thus 
existed as a continually menacing presence. Once infected, the victim 
was likely to die within a matter of weeks. The affliction was 
extremely painful and horribly disfiguring. If the patients did 
manage to survive, it often left them with pockmarked skins, lameness,
2
3blindness, loss of hair, and other crippling and unsightly 
disabilities. Recovering from an attack of smallpox did have one 
major beneficial side-effect: the individual was assured of lifetime 
immunity. When an epidemic of smallpox had run its course, it would 
generally subside as quickly as it had appeared leaving a trail of 
death and mutilation in its wake. There was no telling if and when it 
would return. The fatality rate could range from 10% to over 90%.
Smallpox, introduced by the Spanish into South and Central 
America and by the French into Canada in the fifteenth and sixteenth 
centuries, was considered to have been the chief killer disease 
responsible for wiping out entire native Indian societies in these 
regions. The same catastrophe took its toll of the local Indian 
tribes when the English established their colonies along the Atlantic 
seaboard in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The European 
settlers, many of whom over the years had developed immunity to 
smallpox, fared somewhat better. Nevertheless, they still suffered 
grievous losses from the periodic visitations of smallpox epidemics. 
"In 1736 Dr. Benjamin Gale wrote to Dr. John Huxham, the English 
physician, that one in every seven or eight infected with smallpox in 
America died. The study made by William Douglass showed a death rate 
of one out of every seven cases in the Boston epidemic of 1721. The 
latter outbreak was one of the worst in colonial history."^ At the
1
John Duffy, Epidemics in Colonial America (Baton Rouge:
Louisiana State University Press, 1943), 22.
4mere rumor of smallpox, many people would pack their belongings and 
flee from their homes in the towns and cities for the relative safety 
of the countryside in order to try to avoid the pestilential 
infection.
Amidst the hysteria, superstition, and fear that gripped the
American colonists at the first sign of a smallpox outbreak one
rational conclusion did emerge from their experiences. Quarantining
and isolating infected victims were positive means of controlling and
containing the ravages of the contagion. Since it was obvious at a
fairly early date to the colonists, especially those in the port
cities along the coast, that smallpox was arriving in their
communities by way of infected victims on board contaminated ships,
they quickly initiated steps to place any suspected vessels under
strict quarantine. For example, in 1647 the Boston authorities
established a quarantine procedure for all passengers and crew members
on board ships originating from the West Indies, believed to have been
a prime source of the disease. The quarantine procedures initiated in
Boston were taken up as well by several of the other port cities.
New York City in 1690 followed suit with its first quarantine measure
specifically directed at a ship from St. Nevis carrying small-pox 
2
infected slaves.
Isolation of smallpox victims was the other method of control
2
Donald R. Hopkins, Princes and Peasants: Smallpox in History 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983), 238.
5that soon became an accepted expedient. The selectmen of Salem in the
Massachusetts Bay colony, for instance, issued an order in 1678 that
sought to isolate smallpox victims who were found to be infected on
shore as opposed to those who were shipboard victims. Virginia, in
1667, is said to have passed some of the earliest mandatory
legislation in the colonies to ensure the safe isolation of smallpox 
3
patients. The next logical step it seems would have been to
construct hospitals for smallpox cases. The records show, however,
that the only hospital in colonial North America that was specifically
established to care for smallpox patients was the Hotel-Dieu in Quebec 
4
founded in 1639. Special hospital facilities for isolating and 
treating smallpox sufferers would not arrive in the American colonies 
until the advent of the Revolutionary War.
The single best hope for actually preventing smallpox rested in 
the technique of inoculation. Probably most Americans, both in pre- 
Revolutionary days and during the Revolution itself, considered 
inoculation against smallpox to be a mixed blessing, i.e. if the 
patient recovered, it was clearly a success; and if the patient died, 
then it was of course a failure. Despite the ongoing controversy, 
public opinion was gradually moving in the direction of inoculation. 
The reason was plain. The certainty of obtaining lifetime immunity 
from this killer disease was apparently worth the risk involved in
3
Hopkins, Princes and Peasants, 238. 
4Ibid., 238-9.
6accepting the inoculation procedure; particularly if the risk was seen 
to be diminishing. The final and decisive argument was the track 
record. "The steadily increasing success of inoculation in Boston is 
clearly illustrated by a chart published at the end of the eighteenth 
century by the Massachusetts Historical Society:
Date No. Inoculated Deaths Proportion
1721 247 5 1 in 42
1730 400 12 1 in 33
1752 2,109 31 1 in 70
1764 4,977 46 1 in 108
1776 4,988 28 1 in 178
1778 2,121 19 1 in 112"'
The progress was impressive. Nevertheless, inoculation still 
remained a highly controversial procedure. For one thing, the 
techniques employed in infecting the patients were usually primitive, 
unscientific, and amateurish. Second, many of the so-called "doctors" 
who offered inoculation for a fee were little more than quacks and 
imposters. And third, the common sense safeguards during the critical 
period of infection were frequently neglected or disregarded. People 
tended to go about their routine affairs blithely ignoring the serious 
danger of spreading the virus. The inoculated patients thus 
inadvertently became the carriers of a highly contagious disease.
^Duffy, Epidemics in Colonial America, 36. 
6Ibid., 38.
7Consequently, there were two opposing schools of thought that 
developed with respect to the practice of inoculation, and public 
opinion would swing back-and-forth between the two poles depending 
upon the real or perceived threat of an outbreak of smallpox. All of 
the thirteen colonies at different times over the decades of the 1700s 
passed legislation regulating and controlling the practice of 
inoculation. The degree of enforcement, however, ranged from strict 
to indifferent, with fear being the governing factor. When an 
epidemic threatened, the laws were relaxed. When the danger was 
safely passed, the rules were once again upheld. Occasionally, too, 
the anger and agitation that was aroused by the inoculation dispute
would result in acts of outright violence
The Reverend Cotton Mather, the notable Puritan divine, and Dr. 
Zabdiel Boylston, a Boston physician, are credited with introducing 
the technique of inoculation to America in the summer of 1721 during 
the course of the great smallpox epidemic in Boston that year. On
June 26th, Dr. Boylston "used a 'sharp toothpick arid quill’ to
inoculate his only son Thomas (age six), and two Negro slaves with pus
from a smallpox patient All three developed favorable mild
infections, which made them immune."^ Even though this pioneering 
experiment turned out successfully, both men had to suffer severe 
abuse and villification for their respective roles in this 
humanitarian effort. It was a paradox that would continue well into 
the Revolutionary War years.
^Hopkins, Princes and Peasants, 249.
8The Reverend Cotton Mather, over and above his spiritual duties, 
nourished a long-standing interest in medicine. Through the years, 
Mather observed and noted the different diseases prevalent in Boston 
and elsewhere; although, as far as is known, he himself never engaged 
in any medical experiments or research. However, he diligently 
corresponded with leading scientists in England and on the Continent, 
as well as with his compatriots in the medical profession in the 
colonies. The close ties that he established with key figures in the 
Royal Society in London, the worldwide clearinghouse for scientific 
knowledge, would in later years prove mutually helpful in furthering 
the cause of inoculation on both sides of the Atlantic.
Approaching his sixtieth birthday in 1720, Cotton Mather decided 
to pull together all of his medical writings and correspondence into a 
single compilation to be called, The Angel of Bethesda. The book was
completed but never published in his lifetime (it first appeared in
print in 1972); perhaps because of some of the controversial practices 
that he advanced and advocated therein. In one chapter - "CAP.
XX. Variolae triumphatae: The Small-Pox Encountered." - he listed in 
lengthy detail the symptoms as well as the measures to be used in 
alleviating the physical and emotional distresses caused by the 
disease. In the "Appendix" to this chapter, he then shared with his 
readers a remarkable breakthrough that had apparently come to his 
notice by sheer coincidence:
There has been a Wonderful Practice lately used in
several Parts of the World, which indeed is not yett become
9common in our Nation.
I was first instructed in it, by a Guramantee-Servant 
of my own, long before I knew that any Europeans or 
Asiaticks had the least Acquaintance with it; and some years 
before I was Enriched with the Communications of the Learned 
Foreigners, whose Accounts I found agreeing with what I 
received of my Servant, when he showed me the Scar of the 
Wound made for the Operation; and said, That no Person Ever 
died of the Small-Pox, in their Countrey that had the 
Courage to use it.^
What the Reverend Mather was referring to, of course, was the
technique of inoculation. The story that he had claimed to have heard
originally from his North African slave, Qnisemus (a native of
9
Fezznan, a region in southern Tripoli) , was confirmed by "two 
reports on variolation published in the Philosophical Transactions in 
1714 and 1 7 1 6 . While these scientific reports aroused only 
academic interest in England, it is said that they were directly 
responsible for the introduction of the practice of inoculation into
g
Cotton Mather, The Angel of Bethesda, Gordon W. Jones, ed. 
(Boston: American Antiquarian Society and Barre Publishers, 1972), 93, 
107.
Q
Genevieve Miller, The Adoption of Inoculation for Smallpox.
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1957), 53.
10Duffy, Epidemics in Colonial America, 28.
10
the American colonies.
Cotton Mather, convinced that he had found a practical and
workable solution to controlling smallpox epidemics, began his one-man
campaign to persuade the local medical community to try the novel
12procedure on their patients. H ls approach to Dr. William
Douglass, the sole physician in Boston with a medical degree, was
coldly rejected. The reactions of most of the other conservative
medical men were the same. Dr. Zabdiel Boylston, it seems, was the
only doctor in town who was willing to risk his reputation and the
lives of his patients (including his own son as well as several of the
Mather offspring) in the inoculation experiment. Boylston had
apparently also heard similar stories from local slaves who were
13familiar with the practice in their native regions. The outbreak 
in Boston of the serious smallpox epidemic of 1721 gave Dr. Boylston 
the unique opportunity to test on a relatively large-scale the 
effectiveness of the smallpox procedure.
One Saturday in mid-April 1721, two British ships fresh 
from the West Indies sailed past the quarantine station on
12"Assuming every apothecary to have been a physician, there
were then [in 1721] in the Town [Boston] fourteen." Samuel G. Drake,
History and Antiquities of Boston, From Its Settlement In 1630, To the
Year 1770. (Boston: Published by Luther Stevens, 1836), 561n.
13Duffy, Epidemics in Colonial America, 29.
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Spectacle Island and docked at Boston's Long Wharf. On 
board the Seahorse, two blacks were ill with smallpox and 
several other crewmen were incubating the infection. The 
first two men were confined to houses near the shore, but 
the disease still began to spread. On 26 May, Cotton Mather 
wrote in his diary, 'The grievous calamity of the smallpox 
has now entered the town.'^
The response by the Bostonians to the program of inoculation was
immediate, violent, and wholly unanticipated by its promoters. "As
soon as the news was made public, a 'horrid clamour' arose from many
people in Boston, who held that inoculation was a heathen practice and
should not be adopted by Christians.Cotton Mather was surprised
and shocked by the demonstrations of anger and outrage. He wrote in
The Angel of Bethesda that, "the Vilest Arts were used, and with such
an Efficacy, that not only the Physician, but also the Patients under
the Small-Pox Inoculated were in hazard of their very Lives from an
16Infuriated People." Nor was the Revered Mather himself spared 
from the fury of an aroused populace. The hysteria and wrath 
culminated for him when an explosive device flew through the window of 
his house:
But I myself had thrown into my House in the Dead of the
14Hopkins, Princes and Peasants, 247.
15Duffy, Epidemics in Colonial America, 29.
"^Mather, Angel of Bethesda, 113.
12
Night, a fired Granado, charged with Combustible Matter, and 
in such a Manner, that upon its going off, it must probably 
have killed them that were near it, and would have certainly 
fired the Chamber and speedily have laid the House in Ashes.
But the merciful Providence of God our SAVIOUR so ordered
it, that the Granado passing thro' the Window, had by the
Iron in the Middle of the Casement such a Turn given to it, 
that in falling on the Floor, the fired Wild-fire in the 
Fuse, was violently shaken out some Distance from the Shell, 
and burnt out upon the Floor, without firing off the 
Granado.^  ^
The ultimate insult, however, arrived in the form of a note
apparently attached in some fashion to the above-described fire-bomb.
It read: "COTTON MATHER, You Dog, Dam you, I'll inoculate you with
18this, with a Pox to you." Mather was not intimidated by the live
bomb nor by the threatening message. While he deplored the passions
of the reckless opposition, he went right ahead with his outspoken 
support of the inoculation experiments, in which he continued to 
express complete confidence:
The Opposition was carried on with a Folly, and 
Falsehood, and Malice, hardly ever known to be paralled'd on 
any Occasion; And in the Progress of the Distemper many
18Duffy, Epidemics in Colonial America, 29.
13
Hundreds of Lives were Lost, which might have been Saved, if
the People had not been Satanically filled with Prejudices
against this Method of Safety. However, the Practice went
on, and tho1 the Physician was under Extreme Disadvantage on
more Accounts than one, yett he was attended with Vast
Success. The Experiment has now been made on Several
Hundreds of Persons; and upon both Male and Female, both old
and young, both Strong and Weak, both White and Black, at
all Seasons, of Summer and Autumn and Winter: And they have
generally professed, they had rather undergo the Small-Pox
Inoculated once every year, than undergo the Small-Pox once
19in their Lives after the Common Way, tho* sure to Live.
The scorecard - when the statistical evidence was in - was
impressive. "By the following February [1722] when the epidemic which
numbered 5,889 cases of smallpox was over, Boylston had inoculated 242
persons. Of 835 deaths from smallpox, only six were among inoculated 
20patients." But the opponents of inoculation were not convinced.
Dr. William Douglass in Boston was the leading voice of the anti­
inoculation claque. Ihe gist of his arguments against inoculation are 
summarized in his letter of May 1, 1722, to Dr. Cadwallader Colden in 
New York:
I oppose this novel and dubious practice, not being
19
Mather, Angel of Bethesda, 113.
20Miller, Adoption of Inoculation, 93.
14
sufficiently assured of its safety and consequences; in
short I reckon it a sin to propagate infection by this means
and bring on my neighbor a distemper which might prove fatal
and which perhaps he might escape (as many have done) in the
ordinary way, and which he might certainly secure himself by
removal in this Country where it prevails seldom. However,
many of our clergy had got into it and they scorn to
retract; I had them to appease, which occasioned great Heats
(you may perhaps admire how they reconcile this with their
21doctrine of predestination).
The charges and counter-charges that were flung from the pulpit
and the words bandied about in the pamphlet wars apparently changed
few minds in the colonies. But in England it was another story. "The
news from Boston took several months to reach London, and the
opponents to inoculation made themselves heard first. At the November
16, 1721 meeting of the Royal Society a letter was read from William
Douglass telling that in September around 1000 cases of smallpox
were reported and that sixty had been inoculated. Of these one or two 
22had died." The implication of this letter and similar reports in 
the same tenor was that inoculation had helped to spread the disease.
Cotton Mather was not far behind in presenting to the Royal 
Society his positive version of the events in Boston during the 1721
21Duffy, Epidemics in Colonial America, 30.
22Miller, Adoption of Inoculation, 93-4.
15
smallpox epidemic. "As early as August 17, 1721, when Boylston had
had seventeen successful inoculations, Cotton Mather had resolved to
prepare a treatise on inoculation in order that 'it may be introduced
into the English Nation, and a World of good may be done to the
23miserable Children of Men.'" The statement - An Account of the
Method and Success of Inoculating the Small-Pox in Boston in New-
England. In a Letter from a Gentleman There, to His Friend in London.
- together with a compendium of related material, reached the Royal
Society the following year (1722). These findings were duly published
24in their Philosophical Transactions.
The hard statistical data that had been accumulated in Boston was
carefully studied by the scientific community in England. "Both
Cotton Mather and Boylston realzied the significance of this
statistical approach, which involved one of the first historical
instances of the quantitative analysis of a medical problem. They
assumed that inoculation would stand or fall on the basis of the
'calculus of probabilities' of death under the two types of 
25infection." As it turned out, the findings were heavily in favor 
of the technique of inoculation. "The danger of death was at most
23Ibid., 94.
2hbid., 94-5.
25Otho T. Beall, Jr. and Richard H. Shryock, Cotton Mather:
First Significant Figure in American Medicine (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1954), 108.
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26only one-sixth as great in artificial as in natural infection."
By their combined endeavors, Messrs. Mather and Boylston had taken an 
important step in publicizing the demonstrable benefits of
inoculation. "Their findings made a marked impression at the time
and thus became one essential link in the sequence that led eventually 
to a considerable adoption of the practice in both Europe and 
America.
Thanks mainly to the progressive and farsighted policies of the
Royal Society, the pioneer advocates of inoculation in the American
colonies continued to look to it for support. They were not
disappointed. Dr. Boylston may have been regarded as a pariah in
Boston, but when he visited London he was warmly welcomed and
conspicuously honored. "Dr. Zabdiel Boylston, elected F.R.S. [Fellow
of the Royal Society] on July 7, 1726, after the publication of his
28book on the New England experience." Unfortunately, Cotton 
Mather, who died in 1727/8 but who had long claimed to have been a 
F.R.S., missed receiving the personal accolades of his London 
colleagues that were surely his due.
In Charleston, South Carolina, in 1738, following in the 
footsteps of the Reverend Mather and Dr. Boylston, Dr. James 
Kirkpatrick was the only physician in that town who was willing to
27Ibid., 118.
no
Miller, Adoption of Inoculation, 128.
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inoculate patients during a serious outbreak of smallpox. "He
29inoculated eight hundred persons, of whom only eight died." The
low rate of fatalities was a remarkable achievement. However, Dr.
Kirkpatrick - like Dr. Boylston before him - had to travel to London
to receive recognition for his work. In 1734, he published his Essay
on Inoculation which gave new and valuable ammunition to the
inoculation cause. The founding of the Small-Pox and Inoculation
Hospital in London in 1746 together with the publicity being generated
on behalf of the immunizing procedure gave new impetus to the revival
30of the practice of inoculation.
After years of acrimonious controversy and often heated debates, 
inoculation was finally given an official stamp of approval by the 
prestigious Royal College of Physicians at a meeting in London on 
December 22, 1755:
The College being informed that the Success of 
inoculating the Small Pox, and its reputation in this 
Country, have lately been Misrepresented among Foreigners, 
came to the following Resolution.
That in their Opinion the Objections made at first to 
it have been refuted by experience, and that it is at 
present more generally esteemed and Practised in England 
than ever, and that they Judge it to be a Practice of the
29Hopkins, Princes and Peasants, 254.
30Miller, Adoption of Inoculation, 134.
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31utmost benefit to Mankind.
That consensus judgment by a board of medical experts effectively
settled the dispute. ’’From this time there was no professional
32resistance to inoculation." And gradually the English people came
to accept inoculation and to recognize it as a safe procedure. For
all practical purposes, therefore, the inoculation controversy in
England had evaporated. Public facilities were soon established to
offer smallpox care and inoculation; not only to the wealthy classes
but to the poorer classes as well. The Small-Pox and Inoculation
Hospital in London, for example, reported in 1757 after ten years of
operation, "that 3506 victims of natural smallpox had been treated,
33and 1252 persons had received inoculation."
It is important to note (particularly as it pertains to the 
subject matter of this paper) that the British Army was among the 
first to adopt a smallpox policy for all of its new recruits. One 
authority (Sylvia R. Frey in her book, The British Soldier in America) 
on His Majesty's armies in America during the Revolutionary War has 
written as follows on the subject of the practice of smallpox 
inoculation:
To counteract the exceptional mortality produced by 
this disease [smallpox], the [British] army adopted the 
practice of inoculation. At the beginning of the Seven
31Ibid., 170.
32Ibid. 
^Ibid., 152.
19
Years War, seven out of every nine soldiers in infantry 
regiments had smallpox, and nearly one in four who contracted 
it, "in the natural way" died. By the beginning of the 
Revolution, smallpox rarely occurred in epidemic proportions 
among army personnel.^
By having already adopted inoculation as official Army policy, the 
British forces fighting in the American colonies in 1775-1783 
enjoyed a decided medical advantage over their adversaries, at least 
in the early stages of the conflict.
Broadly speaking, the thirteen American colonies modeled their 
institutions on British precedents. The medical profession was no 
exception but for the fact that in this category it lagged far behind. 
There was, for instance, nothing resembling - in function, prestige, 
or authority - the Royal College of Physicians. Medicine in America 
was still in its infancy. Colonel Louis Duncan in his book, Medical 
Men in the American Revolution 1775-1783, summarizes the state of the 
profession in the period leading up to the war:
At the close of the Colonial government there were two 
American medical colleges: one in Philadelphia, founded in 
1763; the other in New York, founded in 1768. The 
operations of both were suspended by the war. Up to that
34Sylvia R. Frey, The British Soldier in America: A Social 
History of Military Life in the Revolutionary Period (Austin: 
University of Texas Press, 1981), 43.
20
time they had conferred less than fifty medical degrees.
Boston, although a medical center, had as yet no school of
medicine In 1775 there was but one State medical
society, that of New Jersey organized in 1766 There were
also but few hospitals. A hospital had been founded in
Philadelphia as early as 1755.....The second permanent
hospital was that in New York. Erected in 1771 it had been
35destroyed by fire in 1774.
Except for a tiny intellectual elite - there were only a few
foreign trained physicians in the colonies - the views of the English
scientific and medical communities had no significant audience on this
side of the Atlantic. The latest statistical findings and the
techniques for controlling smallpox by inoculation that were being
actively promoted and adopted in England were not as widely
disseminated or as well-known in America. Thus, inoculation continued
to be a practice regarded with irrational fear and looked upon with
superstition. Public attitudes were still heavily shaped and
influenced by rumors, gossip, and local prejudices. These beliefs
tended to translate into legislation. "At one time or another nearly
all the colonies prohibited the practice [of inoculation], but many of
36the laws either lapsed or were subsequently amended or repealed."
35Louis C. Duncan, Medical Men in the American Revolution 1775- 
1783 (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: Medical Field Service School, 1931),
7-8.
36Duffy, Epidemics in Colonial America, 38.
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Virginia is an interesting case in point. In Norfolk, in the
late 1760s, James Parker, one of its wealthiest citizens, ’’provoked
violent riots when they [he and his supporters] inoculated their
37families against the smallpox." These Norfolk riots are said to 
have led directly to the passage of the following Virginia statute 
(published in November of 1768):
An act to regulate the inoculation of the Small-Pox within 
this colony.
I. WHEREAS the wanton introduction of the Small-Pox into 
this colony by inoculation, when the same was not necessary, 
hath, of late years, proved a nuisance to several 
neighbourhoods, by disturbing the peace and quietness of 
many of his majesty’s subjects, and exposing their lives to 
the infection of that mortal distemper, which, from the 
situation and circumstances of the colony, they would 
otherwise have little reason to dread: To prevent which for 
the future, Be It enacted, by the Governor Council, and 
Burgesses, of this present General Assembly, and it is 
hereby enacted, by the authority of the same, That if any 
person or persons whatsoever, shall wilfully, or designedly, 
after the first day of September next ensuing, presume to 
import or bring into this colony, from any country or place
37John E. Selby, The Revolution in Virginia 1775-1783 
(Williamsburg: Colonial Williamsburg Foundation, 1988), 59-60.
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whatever, the small-pox, or any variolous or infectious
matter of the said distemper, with a purpose to inoculate
any person or persons whatever, or by any means whatever, to
propagate the said distemper within this colony, he or she,
so offending, shall forfeit and pay the sum of one thousand
38pounds, for every offence so committed.
Some fifty-plus years after Cotton Mather and Zabdiel Boylston in
Boston had introduced the controversial technique of inoculation into
the American colonies, the ongoing inoculation debate finally came to
a head for the Continental Army (if not necessarily for the civilian
population) during the War of Independence. Most of the leaders of
the Revolution - military and political - would undoubtedly have
agreed with the sentiments expressed by Governor Jonathan Trumbull of
Connecticut when he wrote to John Hancock, the president of the
Continental Congress in Philadelphia, on July 3, 1776: "The Smallpox
39is a more terrible Enemy than the British Troops." The question 
on which they disagreed - often quite passionately - was whether 
inoculation was the problem or the cure. This was the key issue that 
General Washington, as Commander-in-Chief, was called upon to address 
and hopefully to resolve.
38William W. Hiening, ed., The Statutes at Large: Being a 
Collection of all the Laws of Virginia (Richmond: Cochran, 1821),
8:371-2.
39Papers of the Continental Congress, 1774-1789 (Microcopy 247, 
Roll 80, Item No. 66), J[:193.
CHAPTER I
GENERAL WASHINGTON AND THE SMALLPOX
George Washington's own bout with the smallpox began when he was
suddenly stricken by the disease on a trip to the Caribbean island of
Barbados in 1751. The nineteen-year-old Washington had accompanied
his older half-brother, Lawrence, who was seeking relief in a tropical
climate for his tubercular condition. Shortly after landing, George
had apparently contracted the virus. His first diary entry mentioning
smallpox is dated November 4th, 1751: "This morning received a card
from Major Clarke, welcoming us to Barbadoes, with an invitation to
breakfast and dine with him. We went, - myself with some reluctance,
as the smallpox was in his family."^ Washington later confided in
his diary that he "was strongly attacked with the small Pox: sent for
Dr. Lanahan whose attendance was very constant till my recovery, and
2
going out which was not 'till thursday the 12th of December."
During the twenty-six days of his illness, Washington went
^Donald Jackson, ed., The Diaries of George Washington 1748-65
(Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1976, 1925), _I:73.
2
John C. Fitzpatrick, ed., The Diaries of George Washington 
1748 - 1770 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1925), _I:25.
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through an agonizing period of severe pain and acute suffering and
discomfort. Starting with a high fever on November 17th, the disease
progressed to violent headaches and pains in the back and loins. Then
red spots appeared on his forehead and among the hair roots. These
soon turned into thickly set papules and finally to vesicles. The
postules that developed from the vesicles eventually dried up and were
replaced by scabs that itched furiously until they fell off.
Underneath the scabs were reddish brown spots. "George knew that
these would leave 'pits' which he would carry with him through life,
but he had won the fight that almost every man of his generation
3
expected to have to wage."
How did Washington manage to recuperate from a disease that was
usually considered to be fatal once contracted? Donald Jackson,
editor of the most recent edition of Washington's Diaries, theorized
that, "it is conceivable that GW [George Washington] had been
inoculated sometime before his trip to Barbados, causing his attack to
Zj.
be a relatively mild one." Whatever the explanation, George 
Washington now enjoyed lifetime immunity. Furthermore, his personal 
experiences with the disease apparently left him convinced that 
inoculation was the only real and meaningful control. He subsequently 
became a fervent and outspoken advocate of the procedure, in spite of
3
Douglas S. Freeman, George Washington: A Biography 
(N.Y.: Scribner, 1948), One:253.
^Jackson, Diaries of George Washington, 33.
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the acknowledged risks involved.
Having successfully survived his attack of smallpox, the record
shows that Washington was next concerned to protect his valuable but
vulnerable human property, his slaves, from the scourge. When several
of his slaves were stricken with the smallpox in the spring of 1760,
Washington moved quickly to halt the contagion:
[I] received letters from Winchester informing me that
the Small Pox had got among my Quarter’s in Frederick;
determined therefore to leave Town [Williamsburg] as soon as
possible and proceed up to them I was informd that Harry
& Kit, the first of my Negroes that took the Small Pox were
Dead and Roger & Phillis the only two down with it were
recovering from it After taking the Doctrs. Direction's
in regard to my People I set out for my Quarters Engagd.
Vale. Crawford to go in pursuit of a Nurse to be ready in
case more of my People shd. be seized with the same
disorder Got Blankets and every other requisite from
Winchester & settld things upon the best footing I could to
prevt. the Small Pox from Spreading - and in case of its
spreading for the care of the Negroes. Mr. Vale. Crawford
agreeing in case any more of the People at the lower
Quarters getting it to take them home to his House - & if
any of those of the Upper Quarter gets it to have them
5removd into my Room and the Nurse sent for.
5Ibid., 273, 276-7.
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Washington, of course, was just as concerned with protecting the
members of his own immediate family as he was with protecting his
slave property. In the spring of 1771, an interesting family episode
occurred that throws further light on the extent of Washington's faith
in inoculation. His stepson, John Parke Custis, or "Jackie" as he was
affectionately called, seemingly on his own initiative had sought to
become immunized. "Jackie's” tutor, the Reverend Jonathan Boucher,
agreed to act as the intermediary in this delicate matter since Mrs.
Washington felt very uneasy about exposing her only son to the hazards
of the inoculation procedure. According to Washington's biographer,
Douglas Southall Freeman, "Martha had expressed her wish that her son
might have this protection but she never had been able to bring
herself to approve the required step. She had said, in fact, that she
wished 'Jackie' might be inoculated and might be out of danger before
she knew anything about it, so that, in Washington's words, 'she might
escape those tortures which suspense would threw her into, little as
6the cause might be for it.'" With Washington's explicit but tacit 
consent, the Reverend Boucher took the boy to Baltimore and had him 
inoculated surreptitiously there. Freeman concludes that, "Washington 
had never planned a military operation with greater care than he now 
displayed in arranging to keep from Martha the news of the inoculation 
until 'Jackie' had completely recovered."^ Happily for all
Freeman, George Washington, Three:268. 
I^bid.
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concerned, when his worried mother next saw him, the youngster was
healthy, unmarked, and with nothing to fear from the smallpox for the
rest of his life.
Martha Washington, for reasons best known to herself, stubbornly
resisted inoculation for almost five more years despite the
importunings of her husband. Only when she visited Washington's
headquarters in New York City in the spring of 1776 and was seriously
exposed to infection did she finally yield. The General wrote to his
brother, John Augustine Washington, from New York on April 29th that,
"Mrs. Washington is still here, and talks of taking the Small Pox, but
8I doubt her resolution." Martha did manage to overcome her long-
held misgivings the next month in Philadelphia. Washington duly
reported to his brother (John Augustine) on May 31st that, "Mrs.
Washington is now under inoculation in this City [Philadelphia]; and
will, I expect, have the Small pox favourably, this is the 13th day,
g
and she has very few Postules." True to her husband's prognosis, 
Martha fully recovered from her ordeal and was now numbered among the 
immune in the Washington family.
Although, as far as is known, Washington had never taken a public 
position with respect to inoculation, it is obvious from his own 
experiences that he was personally convinced of its efficacy. This
o
John C. Fitzpatrick, ed., The Writings of George Washington 
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1932), _4:531.
9Ibid., 5:93.
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opinion would be put to the test when Washington took command of the
Continental Army in Cambridge in July of 1775. On the 21st of that
month, he wrote to John Hancock mentioning briefly the precautions he
was instituting to prevent any outbreak of the disease:
I have been particularly attentive to the least
Symptoms of the small Pox and hitherto we have been so
fortunate, as to have every Person removd so soon, as not
only to prevent any Communication, but any Alarm or
Apprehension it might give in the Camp. We shall continue
10the utmost Vigilance against that most dangerous Enemy.
Practical measures had already been organized by the local 
authorities in Cambridge to isolate smallpox victims even before 
General Washington arrived to take over his command. The editors of
the Washington Papers have summarized these measures in this footnote:
A smallpox hospital had been established for the army 
near Fresh Pond, which lies about a mile and a half west of 
the Cambridge common. On 19 June 1775 General Ward directed 
that a sentry be posted constantly at the gate to the 
smallpox hospital with orders 'to permit no person to go in 
or out except the Doctor & such as the Doctor shall permit
to pass.1 On 2 July Ward ordered each company in the army
10W. W. Abbot, ed., The Papers of George Washington 
(Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1985), Revolutionary 
War Series 1:140.
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to be inspected daily for smallpox symptoms. Any man
suspected of having the disease was to be removed at 
11once.
In his very first "General Orders" dated July 4, 1775, at
Cambridge, General Washington, referring to this same smallpox
hospital, attempted to maintain its isolation. "No Person is to be
allowed to go to Fresh-water pond a fishing or on any other occasion
as there may be a danger of introducing the small pox into the 
12army." So far, the only precautions that Washington had adopted 
to protect his soldiers from epidemics of smallpox were isolation and 
quarantine. Inoculation was apparently not yet considered to be 
either necessary or appropriate. Dr. John Morgan, the Medical 
Director of the Continental Army who arrived in Cambridge in November 
of 1775, confirmed this policy of isolation and quarantine when he 
reported to Washington on December 17th regarding the current status 
of the smallpox threat:
And whereas the Small Pox hath made its appearance at 
several times in the Army, and a number of persons have been 
lately sent out of Boston and landed at point Sherley with 
the small pox on them; it is highly expedient, to fix on a 
proper place, for conveying such persons to, as may have the 
small pox, with the suitable Convenience to prevent its
^Ibid., 58n. 
12Ibid., 55.
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spreading.^
Dr. Morgan’s information that refugees from Boston coming into 
the American lines were infected with the smallpox touched a sensitive 
nerve. General Washington had already been alerted by other sources 
that the British might be deliberately trying to spread the disease 
among his troops. He had written to John Hancock on December 4th 
expressing his serious concern at the rumors that he had heard to this 
effect:
By recent information from Boston, Genl Howe is goeing
to Send out a number of the Inhabitants....there is one
part of the information that I Can hardly give Credit to. A
Sailor Says that a number of those Comeing out have been
inoculated with design of Spreading the Smallpox thro' this 
14Country & Camp.
A week later (on December 11th), Washington again notified President 
Hancock to the effect that:
The information I received that the enemy intended 
Spreading the Small pox amongst us, I could not Suppose them 
Capable of - I now must give Some Credit to it, as it has 
made its appearance on Severall of those who Last Came out 
of Boston, every necessary precaution has been taken to 
prevent its being Communicated to this Army, & the General
13Ibid., Revolutionary War Series _2:541. 
■^Ibid., 486.
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Court will take Care, that it does not Spread through the 
Country.^  ^
It is true that Boston suffered a serious epidemic of smallpox
in the siege of 1773-6, and there may well have been some
justification for suspecting the British of trying to spread the
disease to the Americans. As a matter of fact, they had resorted to
germ warfare before (although there is no evidence that Washington had
any knowledge of this earlier episode). One documented incident
occurred during the Pontiac uprising in 1763. The British General,
Sir Jeffery Amherst, in command of the British Armies in North
America, made this unusual suggestion to his field commander, Colonel
Henry Bouquet: "Could it not be contrived to send the small pox among
the disaffected tribes of Indians? We must on this occasion use every
stratagem in our power to reduce them. ’ Bouquet answered that he
would try to spread an epidemic with infected blankets and mentioned a
16wish to hunt ’the vermin’ with dogs." Another slightly different 
version of the same incident is reported as follows: "He [General
Amherst] added that he had heard that smallpox had broken out at Fort 
Pitt and wondered whether the disease could not be spread to good 
advantage. Bouquet replied, 'I will try to inoculate the bastards 
with some blankets that may fall in their hands, and take care not to
15Ibid., 533-4.
16Howard H. Peckham, Pontiac and the Indian Uprising (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1947), 226-7.
32
get the disease myself.'"^
Whatever the outcome of their germ warfare plans - first against
the Indians and later possibly against the Americans - the devious
intentions by the British to employ the smallpox weapon remained
suspect throughout the Revolution. Though actual proof of complicity
seems to be lacking, General Washington nevertheless continued to be
apprehensive of the enemy’s motives. As late as the Yorktown
campaign, he was keenly alert to the smallpox menace while issuing
these warnings (dated September 29, 1781) to his officers on the march
southward: "Our ungenerous Enemy having as usual propagated the small
Pox in this part of the Country, the Commander in Chief forbids the
Officers and soldiers of this Army [from] having any connection with
the Houses or Inhabitants in this neighbourhood or borrowing any
18utensils from them."
Another smallpox precaution that Washington initiated took place 
when the British evacuated the pestilence-ridden town of Boston in 
March of 1776. He carefully ordered into the area at first only 
soldiers who were known to be immune to the smallpox (as he reported 
to John Hancock in his letter of March 19th): "As soon as the
Ministerial Troops had quitted the Town, I order’d a Thousand Men (who 
had had the Small Pox) under the Command of General Putnam to take
■^John C. Long, Lord Jeffery Amherst: A Soldier of the King
(N.Y.: MacMillan, 1933), 186-7.
18Fitzpatrick, Writings of George Washington, 23:152.
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19possession of the Heights."
On July 20th, 1775, General Washington wrote to his brother
Samuel (Washington): "I came to this place [Cambridge] the 2d Instant
& found a numerous army of Provencials under very little command,
20discipline, or order." Men mostly from rural communities who had 
never been exposed to the smallpox virus and who consequently had no 
immunity to the disease were suddenly thrown together in crude 
encampments living in crowded and often insanitary conditions. An 
outbreak of smallpox under these circumstances could have proven to be 
a disaster for the Continental Army. The fact that General 
Washington, together with the local Massachusetts authorities and with 
the help of his new Medical Director, Dr. John Morgan, were able to 
forestall this possibility stands as a tribute to their collective 
organizing skills. Also, the fact that they achieved their goal by 
relying solely on the non-controversial measures of quarantine and 
isolation demonstrates the effectiveness of these relatively benign 
methods of smallpox control. Thus, up to this stage of the war, there 
seemed to be no urgent call for engaging in the risky business of 
inoculation. And General Washington, whatever his personal feelings 
or inclinations regarding inoculation, apparently felt no compulsion 
to consider taking steps in this direction. The campaign in Canada, 
however, would quickly serve to change his mind.
19Abbot, Papers of George Washington, Revolutionary War Series
3:490.
20Ibid., Revolutionary War Series _1:135.
CHAPTER II
DISASTER IN CANADA
The news from Canada was most distressing. Dr. John Morgan, the 
Medical Director of the Continental Army, wrote as follows from New 
York City on June 25th, 1776: "To the Honorable Samuel Adams Esqr.
Member of the Medical Committee of Congress:"
The State of the Army in Canada, according to Dr.
Lind’s Account (who is just arrived from thence, by Order of 
Genl Sullivan, for a Supply of Medicines) is truly 
deplorable. I have seen no Returns of the Sick, but he 
assures me, that in the beginning of this Month, there were 
no less than 1800 Men down with the Small Pox, and the Total 
of Sick and unfit for duty amounted to 3,300 Men, and he 
says, they have no Medicines. Such a Report is scarcely 
credible, but you may learn the particulars yourself from 
him, as he intends going to Philadelphia.^
There is no record of Sam Adams' reaction to this news. But 
Congress had indeed received earlier warnings of the smallpox toll on
i
Papers of the Continental Congress, 1774-1789 (Microcopy 247, 
Roll 77. Item No. 63), 190.
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the Continental forces operating in Canada. John Adams, who was also
serving with his cousin Sam in the Continental Congress in
Philadelphia in 1776, had been informed by Samuel Chase (in a letter
sent from upstate New York on April 21st, 1776) that "we on the 5th,
had before Quebec, 2500 [Men], of which about 800 are in the Hospital
2
(the far greater part of the small Pox)."
By the summer of 1776, when the full impact of the disaster in 
Canada had become painfully apparent, John Adams was busy assigning 
the blame. In his correspondence of June 9th from Philadelphia, he 
enumerated eight reasons for the failure of the expeditions against 
Quebec. The last (eighth) one read: "The Small Pox, an unexpected
Enemy, and more Terrible than British Troops, Indians, or even Tories,
3
invaded our Armies and defeated them more than once." And in his
letter of July 2nd, John Adams ventured this prediction: "The Small
Pox is an Enemy more terrible in my Imagination, than all others.
This Distemper will be the ruin of every Army from New England if
4
great Care is not taken."
As the American invasion of Canada collapsed in the summer months 
of 1776, the smallpox was almost invariably cited as the chief villain 
in the calamity. Brigadier-General Benedict Arnold, in his letter to 
Major-General Philip Schuyler of June 13th, from his headquarters at
2
Robert J. Taylor, ed., Papers of John Adams (Cambridge:
Belknap Press, 1979), 4^134.
^Ibid., 243.
^Ibid., 357.
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St. Johns (Canada), wrote: "Near one half of our array are sick,
mostly with the small pox three thousand Men are sick here and at
Chamble[y] and no Room or Conveniency for them. Major-General 
John Sullivan, in his letter to Schuyler of June 24th from his 
headquarters at Isle aux Noix (Canada), reported that "this Cowardly 
affair [the headlong retreat from Quebec and Montreal] together with 
the want of Discipline & that infernal Disorder the Small Pox has 
ruined our Army." And Major-General Horatio Gates, corresponding 
with John Hancock, wrote from Ticonderoga (N.Y.) on July 16th as 
follows:
I submitted and went with General Schuyler and General 
Arnold to Crown Point, where we found the wretched remains 
of what was once a very respectable Body of Troops. —  That 
Pestilential disease, the Smallpox, had taken so deep a root 
that the Camp had more the Appearance of a General Hospital
than an Army I am exerting all my powers to prevent the
pestilence getting to Skeensborough [N.Y. ], for Should the 
Militia order'd there be infected, we shall be distroy'd 
beyond Example.^
When General Washington suggested to the Continental Congress in 
the summer of 1775 that a major offensive be launched against the two
^Papers of the Continental Congress, (Roll 166. Item No.
152), 11:193.
6Ibid., 179.
^Ibid., (Roll 174. Item No. 154), _I:15.
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Canadian strongholds, Montreal and Quebec, a majority of the members 
of Congress enthusiastically agreed. A two-pronged movement was 
subsequently organized. One pincer would travel from Forts 
Ticonderoga and Crown Point in New York up along the western shore of 
Lake Champlain and attack Montreal. The other pincer, coming out of 
Cambridge, would follow the Kennebec and Chaudiere rivers into the St. 
Lawrence. The two pincers would then converge at Quebec for the final 
conquest of Canada. To implement these plans, Congress authorized the 
creation of a Northern Department with General Schuyler as the 
Commander-in-Chief. The little army that assembled at Crown Point in 
August of 1773 to invade Canada numbered perhaps 2000 men and was 
under the command of Brigadier-General Richard Montgomery. General 
Schuyler, having fallen ill, stayed behind.
To look after his soldiers’ medical needs, the Congress, on 
General Schuyler’s personal recommendation, approved the appointment 
of Dr. Samuel Stringer of Albany as Medical Director. It is believed 
that Dr. Stringer established his General Hospital at or near Fort 
George, which was also the headquarters of the Northern Department 
during the Canadian campaign. Congress, it seems, had hardly acted 
soon enough in hiring Dr. Stringer. As early as August 3rd, General 
Schuyler was writing (from his headquarters at Ticonderoga) to 
Governor Jonathan Trumbull of Connecticut, that "the Troops sicken
q
alarmingly fast, ninety-two are now returned ill at this place."
Q
Peter Force, American Archives (Washington: M. St. Clair and 
Peter Force, 1840), Fourth Series, 111:17.
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Nevertheless, the invasion went forward.
Chambly on the Sorel River in Canada fell to the Americans on 
September 24th. St. John's was captured on November 3rd. And 
Montreal surrendered on November 12th. however, sickness, desertions, 
and the expirations of enlistments had reduced General Montgomery’s 
original army to about five-hundred effectives. Leaving behind troops 
to garrison St. John's and Montreal, Montgomery with some three- 
hundred soldiers marched swiftly to join Colonel Arnold in the final 
stage of the expedition, the siege of Quebec. From the available 
records, the smallpox had not yet made serious inroads on the 
Americans. But as the investment of Quebec began in December of 1775, 
cases of smallpox were being reported. The virus had probably been 
brought from Montreal by Montgomery' s men.
Anticipating that the invasion of Canada by the Continental 
regiments in the Northern Department had been set in motion, General 
Washington on August 20th wrote to Philip Schuyler from headquarters 
in Cambridge confirming a coordinate plan "to penetrate into Canada, 
by way of [the] Kennebeck River, and so to Quebec, by a Route 90 Miles 
below Montreal - I can very well spare a Detachment of 1000 or 1200
9
Men." Colonel Arnold was designated by Washington to lead the 
detachment as its commanding officer.
Although they were not mentioned in the official orders, Arnold's
9
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detachment included several medical personnel. Dr. Isaac Senter and 
his three helpers were attached to the overall command. Young Senter, 
only twenty-two years old, who accompanied Colonel Arnold to the gates 
of Quebec and who was one of the lucky few to return safely from the 
Canadian campaign, is the best medical eyewitness to the events that 
took place there. He kept a diary of his activities. This has been 
preserved as The Journal of Isaac Senter and is an invaluable record 
of the sufferings and privations of the Continental soldiers in this 
ill-fated venture.
The story of the march through the Maine wilderness is one of the 
great adventures of all time. Yet, in spite of the incredible 
difficulties and hardships, in mid-November of 1773, in the opinion of 
Colonel Duncan, "the impossible had been achieved, and Arnold stood on 
the Plains of Abraham. Had his force been large enough, even two 
thousand men, Canada would have become part of the United States.
But the Continental Army had been decimated by desertions and disease. 
It was in too weakened a condition to exploit its initial advantage. 
After a futile bloody assault on the citadel of Quebec on December 
31st, in which General Montgomery was killed and Benedict Arnold was 
wounded, the invaders were forced to withdraw. Dr. Senter picks up 
the narrative. Writing in his diary on January 6th, 1776, he comments 
on the growing smallpox problem:
■^Louis C. Duncan, Medical Men in the American Revolution 1773 - 
1783 (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: Medical Field Services School, 1931),
90.
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The small-pox still continued in the army. Numbers of
the soldiers inoculated themselves, and indeed several
officers, tho' contrary to orders at this time. Scarce any
of the New England recruits had ever had the disorder, and
coming into the army when it was very brief, gave
11apprehension of taking it in the natural way.
Failure at Quebec demoralized and discouraged the Americans. The
siege of Quebec was lifted and the retreat commenced. Dr. Senter 
describes his role in preventing outbreaks of smallpox among the 
returning soldiers:
I was ordered by Gen. [John] Thomas, who commanded, to 
repair to Montreal and erect an hospital for their 
reception, as well by the natural way as inoculation. I 
accordingly made application to General Arnold [Arnold had
been promoted to the rank of Brigadier-General], then 
commanding in the city, and obtained a fine capacious house 
belonging to the East India Company. It was convenient for 
nigh six hundred. I generally inoculated a regiment at a 
class, who had it so favourable as to be able to do garrison
duty during the whole time Gen. Thomas caught the
natural small pox, sickened at Sorel, was carried to
Chamblee and died Our army, weakened by the smallpox,
and in fine every movement against the enemy unsuccessful, a
^ The Journal of Isaac Senter (Philadelphia: Historical Society 
of Pa., 1846), 141.
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12retreat was ordered to St. John's.
General Washington in Cambridge received the first reports of the
setback at Quebec on January 17th, 1776. But five months elapsed
before he made any comments (in writing) concerning the role that the
smallpox had played in bringing about the disaster. The death of
General John Thomas elicited this brief observation (in a letter to
Brigadier-General John Sullivan sent on June 13th from New York City):
"Having received Intelligence of the unfortunate Death of General
Thomas, occasioned by the small Pox he had taken, the Command of the
13Army in Canada devolves on you." On July 7th, after the facts of
the defeat and retreat from Canada had become well known, he shared
these further thoughts with Governor Trumbull of Connecticut:
The situation of the Northern Army is certainly
distressing, but no relief can be afforded by me; this I am
persuaded you will readily agree to. I should Supppose, If
proper precautions are taken, the Small pox may be prevented
from spreading, this was done at Cambridge, and I trust
will be contrived by Generals Schuyler and Gates, who are
well apprized of the fatal Consequences that may attend its
14infecting the whole Army.
Washington’s statements of sympathy and good advice had no 
12Journal of Isaac Senter, 141-3.
13John C. Fitzpatrick, ed., The Writings of George Washington 
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1932) _3:132-3.
14Ibid., 234-5.
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practical impact in mitigating the smallpox epidemics then raging in 
the Northern Department. Without any real guidance from the 
Commander-in-Chief, the situation soon deteriorated into a state of 
contradictions and confusion. Thus, the irony of Dr. Senter, 
according to his own account, busy inoculating the regiments of 
Continental soldiers while his superiors were simultaneously issuing 
orders outlawing the procedure:
General Orders before QUEBECK, MARCH 15, 1776.
As the spreading [of] the Small-Pox at this juncture 
will probably prove the entire ruin of the Army, the 
officers are desired to take all possible care to prevent 
it, by keeping the men from strolling from their quarters.
The Surgeons of the Army are forbid, under the severest 
penalty, to inoculate any person. And as many officers and 
men are preparing for the small-pox, it is said with an 
intention of taking it by inoculation; to prevent the fatal 
consequences attending such conduct, those who are found 
guilty, if officers, will be immediately cashiered; if 
private soldiers, punished at the discretion of a Court- 
Martial."^
The only preventive smallpox measures that appear to have had the 
unanimous endorsement of the authorities - by the field commanders in 
the Northern theater of operations as well as by the Commander-in- 
Chief - were isolation and quarantine:
15Force, American Archives, III:551
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General Orders before QUEBECK, FEBRUARY 11, 1776.
Whereas the repeated orders given to prevent the
spreading of that fatal disorder the Small-Pox, have been in
a great measure disregarded; it is ordered that the
commanding officer of every company immediately send such of
his company as are seized with it to the Hospital; and all
soldiers who shall know of any persons with that disorder in
their private quarters, and do not make immediate complaint
thereof to the Barrackmaster, shall be treated as neglecting
16their duty, and guilty of a breach of the orders.
During the late winter and early spring of 1776, General
Washington apparently still nourished hopes of a victory at Quebec and 
he diligently continued to send whatever supplies and reinforcements 
he could spare to the north. But the flow of ominous tidings from 
Canada did not support his optimism. For instance, General Moses 
Hazen communicated to General Schuyler from Montreal on April 1st: "I
have pretty good information that our strength in camp before Quebeck 
did not, on the 18th of March, much exceed that of the day after
General Montgomery*s fall. General Arnold had at that time about four
hundred men in a small-pox H o s p i t a l . A n d  General David Wooster, 
now in command at Quebec, sent to Congress on April 10th this gloomy 
appraisal: "Troops come in to our assistance but slowly; and a great
part of them who have arrived have been but of very little service, on
16Ibid., V:550. 
17Ibid., 751-2.
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account of the small-pox.” On May 1st, a Congressional Commission
sent to Canada from Philadelphia to evaluate firsthand the worsening
outlook in the Northern Department, concluded their report from
Montreal with these prophetic words: "The small-pox is in the Army,
19and General Thomas has, unfortunately, never had it.”
The arrival in Canada of strong British reinforcements in the 
spring of 1776 put an end to the American invasion of its northern 
neighbor. The hasty withdrawal that had begun from Quebec in May 
continued until the last of the Continental troops were back on their 
own territory by mid-summer. The best that General Washington could 
anticipate was that the retreat would remain orderly and would not 
turn into a disastrous rout. Hie counted on his newly-appointed 
commander, General John Sullivan, to implement this difficult and 
dismal assignment when he wrote him on June 13th: ”1 am therefore, to
request your most strenuous Executions to retrieve our Circumstances 
in that Quarter, from the melancholy Situation they are now in, and 
for performing the arduous Tasks of bringing Order out of 
Confusion.
However strong his exertions might have been, General Sullivan 
could not seem to find a quick and satisfactory solution to the 
smallpox infections that continued to plague his army. On July 29th, 
for instance, General Gates forwarded this depressing dispatch to
■^Ibid., 845-6.
■^Ibid., 1166.
20Fitzpatrick, Writings of George Washington, _5:132-3.
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General Washington:
Those troops, when they arrive [from Canada], are all
ordered to halt at Skenesborough. Everything about this
Army is infected with the pestilence; the clothes, the
blankets, the air, and the ground they walk upon. To put
this evil from us, a General Hospital is established at Fort
George, where there are now between two and three thousand
sick, and where every infected person is immediately sent;
but this care and caution has not yet effectually destroyed
the disease here; it is notwithstanding continually breaking 
21out.
Not only was the smallpox taking its toll of sick and dying 
soldiers, the fear of catching the deadly disease was seriously 
undermining morale and thus greatly hampering the enlistment of new 
recruits for the Continental service. That was the gist of Governor 
Trumbull's letter of July 4th to General Washington:
The prevalence of the small pox among them [the troops] 
is every way unhappy; our people in General have not had 
that Distemper. Fear of the Infection operates strongly to 
prevent Soldiers from engageing in the service and the 
Battalions Ordered to be raised in this Colony [Connecticut] 
fill up slowly.^
21Force, American Archives, Fifth Series, .1:650-1.
22Papers of the Continental Congress, (Roll 166. Item No. 152), 
11:205-7.
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In fact, in his letter the very next day (July 5th) to John Hancock
in Philadelphia, Governor Trumbull outlined the monetary inducements
that the Connecticut Legislature had decided to pass in order to try
to help boost enlistments to fill the ranks of the Continental Line:
[Because] the small pox in Canada naturally would deter
those from engageing in the Service who had never passed
thro' that Distemper, it was thought necessary by the
Assembly to encourage them to Enlist by offering them a
Bounty, and accordingly six pounds as a bounty to each able
bodied man that should inlist into the Batallion destined
for Canada and three pounds for those destined to New 
23York.
The ultimate goal that the military and political leaders were
seeking to realize was a practical and expedient way of bringing to an
end the constant menace of devastating outbreaks of smallpox epidemics
in the Continental Army. "Are there no measures [that] may be taken
to remove the impediment [and] may not the Army soon [be] freed from 
24that Infection?" This is how Governor Trumbull put the question 
to General Washington in his letter of July 4th. On July 5th, the 
Governor sought to promote with President Hancock the idea of 
assigning Connecticut troops to more healthy theaters (like New York) 
instead of to the Northern Department as one means of hedging the 
smallpox threat:
23Ibid., (Roll 80. Item No. 66), I_:193. 
24Ibid., (Roll 166. Item No. 152), 11:205-7.
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Might not some of our Troops be sent to New York and
serve there instead of the York or Jersey Battalions, which
have generally passed thro that distemper, such an Exchange
would be very agreeable, and greatly facilitate the filling
up [of] our Regiments; our Intelligence from Crown point
shows the Infection to be very great in our returning 
25Army.
Following the abandonment of Canada, there was much finger-
pointing and soul-searching. John Adams in the Continental Congress,
among the earliest and strongest Congressional supporters of the
Canadian invasion and later probably the most vociferous critic of the
manner in which it had been carried out, asked this question in his
correspondence (with Samuel Cooper[?]) of June 9th: "The Small Pox is
a Terrible Enemy, but why could not this have been kept out of the
26Camp before Quebec?" Dr. John Morgan wrote to Sam Adams on June
25th: "Had there been a General Hospital in Canada, there would have
been better Order, and some Subordination obtained, which is now 
27wholly wanting." General Philip Schuyler, corresponding with John 
Hancock on August 16th, placed the blame for the smallpox calamity 
squarely on the unauthorized practice of inoculation:
I am just now informed, by good authority, that some of
25Ibid., (Roll 80. Item No. 66), 1:193.
9 6Taylor, Papers of John Adams, _4:242.
27Papers of the Continental Congress, (Roll 77. Item No. 63),
190.
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the Militia from the eastward have inoculated themselves on
the march to Skenesborough I am also informed that all
the Field-Officers of one regiment have done the same at 
Skenesborough. I shall instantly write to General Gates on 
the subject, and direct that none of them be suffered to 
join the Army to prevent this terrible disaster from again 
distressing us.^
General Schuyler was among the foremost of the commanders in the
Northern Department notorious for his facility for straddling the
inoculation issue. On February 15th, 1777, for example, he
communicated to Congress that "I fear Nothing will prevent Villains
from continuing to inoculate in the Army, unless a Resolution of
Congress making it Death for any Officer or Soldier to suffer himself
29to be inoculated and for any person that does it." Yet a month
later, on March 8th (perhaps because he had in the meantime received
instructions from the Commander-in-Chief), he wrote to Congress again,
this time expressing the exact opposite sentiments: "His Excellency
General Washington has recommended to me to assist the Army in this
[Northern] Department to be inoculated: it appears highly 
„30necessary.
The role of the medical personnel of the Continental Army in the 
28Force, American Archives, Fifth Series, _1:984-5.
29Papers of the Continental Congress, (Roll 173. Item No. 153), 
111:88.
30Ibid., 110.
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Canadian campaign is a blurred picture. Dr. Samuel Stringer, the 
Medical Director of the Northern Department, apparently ran the 
General Hospital at Fort George throughout the period and was 
responsible for the care of the returning sick and wounded soldiers. 
His hospital records have been lost. Of the regimental surgeons and 
mates who had accompanied General Montgomery's army, virtually nothing 
is known. Only Dr. Senter has managed to preserve his personal 
glimpses of the expedition. General Washington in Cambridge (and 
later in New York) was too far removed by distance to exercise any 
direct operational control over the medical problems facing his 
soldiers in Canada. He had to rely almost entirely on the judgment 
and good sense of his field commanders. Unfortunately, the lack of 
central authority, and in particular an established policy on 
inoculation, led to many of the contradictions in orders and probably 
to much of the resulting chaos and confusion.
Quantitatively, what was the extent and impact of the smallpox on 
the Continental Army in Canada? One "Return of Troops in Canada, May 
11, 1776," shows the following enumeration:
Fit for Duty Sick
Colonel Reed's Regt., N.H............... 350   81
Colonel Stark's Regt., N.H.............. 389   40
Colonel Poor's Regt., N.H............... 406   96
Colonel Patterson's Regt., Mass.........  238   71
Greaton's Regt., Mass...........  281   52
Bond' s Regt., Mass.............. 230   43
Colonel Wayne's, Penn................... 128   28
50
Fit for Duty Sick
Irvine's, Penn.................. 609   33
Dayton's, N.J..................  528   28
Wind's, N.J....................  377   28
De Haas', Penn.................. 471   68
Bedel's, N.H...................  106   53
Maxwell's, N.J.................. 227    64
Burrell's, Conn................. 279   263
Porter's ......................  109   254
St. Clair's, Penn............... 312   51
5040 125331
Although this particular tabulation does not give any breakdowns, it
can be inferred that one of the chief causes of sickness was the
smallpox. An earlier report from Quebec - "A Return of the Troops 
before QUEBECK, in the service of the United Colonies, MARCH 30, 1776" 
- which is shown as Fig. 1 on the following page (51), does specify 
the smallpox cases and thus tends to confirm this assumption.
The inhabitants of the American colonies in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries were afflicted with a wide variety of epidemic 
diseases: smallpox, diptheria, scarlet fever, yellow fever, measles, 
whopping cough, mumps, tubverculosis, malaria, dysentery, typhoid 
fever, and syphilis, to name some of the most common maladies. Yet 
the single disease in this list that was universally dreaded and that 
claimed so many fatalities, smallpox, was also the single disease that
31Duncan, Medical Men in the American Revolution, 108.
A  Return of the Troops before Quebeck, in the service of 
the United Colonies, Makch30, 1770.
R egim ents .
Eff
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. D isorders.
Colonel Warner’s...... 102 271 373Sma 11-Pox by inocula­
tion.
Major Cady’s.... ..... 82 50 132 Do. do.
Colonel De Haas's...... •225 - 2=15
Major Brown’s Detachment... 3d 13-2 170 Do. do.
General Wooster’s...... 4‘2 48 00 Do. do.
Colonel McDougall’s..... 7ti 115 101Small Pox, great and 
various.
C.donel Van Siliaick’s... 81 77 158Various.
Colonel Clinton's....... ‘207 20 227Various.
Colonel Holmes’s....... 01 23 114Various.
Colonel Livingston's..... 20(1 . 200.
General Arno'd's....... 117 50 167Various and wounded
Captain Wool’s Artillery.. 31 - 31
Colonel Dnegan's....... 123 . 123
Colonel Mavwell’s...... 210 . 216
Colonel Fellows’s....... 8-2 - 82
Total........... 1710 7862505
Fig. 1
32
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could best be coped with by the medical men of that era. At least 
they knew how to use quarantine and isolation to control its spread; 
and inoculation to help prevent infection and provide immunity.
This elementary knowledge by itself was not sufficient to keep 
the smallpox scourge from continuing its ravages throughout the early 
period of the Revolutionary War for two basic reasons: First, none of
the initial preventive measures was adequately and consistently 
employed; and second, none of the known steps to control smallpox was 
risk-free. Therefore, it was soon apparent to the leaders of the 
Revolution that tough decisions would have to be made and enforced in 
order to clear up the ambivalence. Specifically, a firm policy 
regarding quarantine and inoculation needed to be established to deal 
effectively with the ever-present threat of smallpox to the 
Continental soldiers gathered in army camps and marching units. The 
leaders recognized that while the smallpox plague could never be 
completely eliminated, it could definitely be minimized.
Thus, the Canadian disaster did have a very positive effect: it 
set the stage for a resolute policy on inoculation. While most agreed 
that something had to be done to avert another Canadian-type fiasco, 
it was up to the Commander-in-Chief to make the final determination. 
Quarantine and isolation had worked well enough during the Boston 
siege, but it had proven inadequate in Canada. Inoculation, in spite 
of its known risks, was an answer. The decision on whether or not to 
accept the risks now rested with General Washington.
CHAPTER III
SMALLPOX AND THE CONTINENTAL ARMY
On January 6th, 1777, from his winter headquarters at Morristown, 
N.J., General Washington wrote to the then Medical Director of the 
Continental Amy, Dr. William Shippen, Jr., detailing the following 
specific instructions with respect to inoculation:
Finding the small pox to be spreading much and fearing 
that no precaution can prevent it from running thro' the 
whole of our Amy, I have determined that the Troops shall 
be inoculated. This expedient may be attended with some 
inconveniences and some disadvantages, but yet I trust, in 
its consequences will have the most happy effects.
Necessity not only authorizes but seems to require the 
measure, for should the disorder infect the Amy, in the 
natural way, and rage with its usual Virulence, we should 
have more to dread from it, then from the Sword of the 
Enemy. Under these circumstances, I have directed Doctr.
Bond, to prepare immediately for inoculating in this 
Quarter, keeping the matter as secret as possible, and 
request, that you will without delay inoculate all the 
Continental Troops that are in Philadelphia and those that
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shall come in, as fast as they arrive. You will spare no
pains to carry them thro' the disorder with the utmost
expedition, and to have them cleansed from the infection
when recovered, that they may proceed to Camp, with as
little injury as possible, to the Country thro' which they
pass. If the business is immediately begun and favoured
with the common success, I would fain hope they will be soon
fit for duty, and that in a short space of time we shall
have an Army not subject to this, the greatest of all
calamities that can befall it, when taken in the natural 
1way.
Thus, by a stroke of his pen, General Washington put an end to 
the long-running inoculation controversy; at least insofar as the 
military forces under his jurisdiction were concerned. Hie 
Continental Army now had in place a firm and clearly stated policy on 
inoculation which everyone would come to understand (once the initial 
secrecy was lifted) and which every soldier was expected to obey. The 
personal discretion of the individual field commanders in this matter 
had been replaced by the authority of the Commander-in-Chief. The 
Medical Department could proceed to establish proper hospital 
facilities for treating its smallpox patients. New recruits were 
assured that they would be given the best available protection against 
the smallpox virus. Immunized soldiers could move with relative
■^John C. Fitzpatrick, ed., The Writings of George Washington 
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1932), _6:473-4.
55
freedom in areas where the smallpox was endemic without fear of 
contracting it. General Washington's landmark order of January 6th 
was carried out for the most part effectively and efficiently by the 
medical personnel of the Continental Army. In retrospect, the action 
proved successful in achieving its objectives.
For approximately the first eighteen months of his command,
however, Washington seemed committed to pursuing an anti-inoculation
policy. He did so for several valid reasons. Many of the colonies
had statutes on the books prohibiting inoculation and Washington, as a
public figure, prided himself on obeying the law. As has been
emphasized in previous chapters, public opinion itself was sharply
divided, often very passionately, on the issue. Enlistments were
dropping off; perhaps in part due to the smallpox scare. In New York
in the spring and summer of 1776, sickness and disease had begun to
take a serious toll of the men of the Continental Army. Colonel
Duncan records that "a return of the army [in New York] at the middle
of September [1776] showed that of the rank and file there were
present, fit for duty, 15,243; present sick, 6,098; absent sick,
1,215. The total number of sick was 8,528, more than a third of the 
2
army." A program of mandatory inoculation might well serve to 
worsen the medical crisis. In any case, on May 20th, General 
Washington issued these stringent orders:
No Person whatever, belonging to the Army, is to be
2
Louis C. Duncan, Medical Men in the American Revolution 1775— 
1783 (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: Medical Field Service School, 1931), 7.
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innoculated for the Small-Pox— those who have already 
undergone that operation, or who may be seized with Symptoms 
of that disorder, are immediately to be removed to the 
Hospital provided for that purpose on Montresor Island. Any 
disobedience to this order, will be most severely punished—  
As it is at present of the utmost importance, that the 
spreading of that distemper, in the Army and City, should be 
prevented.^
On May 20th, this interesting episode concerning the ban on 
smallpox inoculations appeared in Washington’s General Orders:
In Provincial Congress, New York, May 25, 1776.
 Doctor Foster appearing before the Committee says, that
information was given to General Putnam, that several 
persons had been inoculated, at the house of one Fisher, in 
Stone Street, contrary to a resolve of the Provincial 
Congress of this Colony, he, the examinant (agreeable 
to Genl: Putnam's order) immediately went to the house of 
the above mentioned Fisher, where he discovered that Lt. 
Colonel Moulton, Capt. Parks, Doctor Hart and Lieut. Brown 
had been inoculated by Doctor Azor Betts.
Doctor Azor Betts being sent for, appeared before the 
Committee, allowed the charge against him, and offer’d in 
his vindication— that he had been repeatedly applied to by 
the officers of the Continental Army to inoculate them, that
3
Fitzpatrick, Writings of George Washington, 63.
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he refused but being overpersuaded, he at last inoculated 
the persons above-mentioned.
Resolved, That Doctor Azor Betts, be committed to the 
Gaol of this City, and be kept in safe custody, until 
released by the Provincial Congress.
Ordered, That a Copy of the minutes relating to Doctor 
Azor Bett's case, be handed to the Provincial Congress...
Messrs. Berrian and Harpur further inform, that the 
wife of Azor Betts, on her examination, says That Lieut. 
Seymour from Long Island had informed her, that seven 
persons of the Army (Officers as she understood) on Long 
Island, were taking mercurial preparations, and as he 
supposed, were inoculated, or preparing to be inoculated for 
the small pox.
Ordered. That a Copy of the report of the General 
Committee, to this Congress, be delivered to Major Genl. 
Putnam— that he give such direction to the Continental Army, 
for preventing the Small Pox among them on Long Island, as 
he may think necessary.
Since General Washington at this time was not in favor of 
inoculation for the officers and men of the Continental Army, he 
readily agreed with the above findings of the New York Provincial 
Congress:
The General presents his Compliments to the Honorable
^Ibid., 62-3.
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the Provincial Congress, and General Committee, is much 
obliged to them, for their Care, in endeavouring to prevent 
the spreading of the Small-pox (by Inoculation or any other 
way) in this City, or in the Continental Army, which might 
prove fatal to the army, if allowed of, at this critical 
time, when there is reason to expect they may soon be called 
to action; and orders that the Officers take the strictest 
care, to examine into the state of their respective Corps, 
and thereby prevent inoculation amongst them; which, if any 
Soldier should presume upon, he must expect the severest 
punishment.
Any Officer in the Continental Amy, who shall suffer 
himself to be inoculated, will be cashiered and turned out 
of the army, and have his name published in the News papers 
throughout the Continent, as an Enemy and Traitor to his 
Country.
Upon the first appearance of any eruption, the Officer 
discovering of it in any Soldiers, is to give information to 
the Regimental Surgeon, and the Surgeon make report of the 
same, to the Director General of the hospital."*
It is impossible to say from the available records exactly when 
General Washington decided to completely reverse his course and to 
embrace, instead of condemn, inoculation. Perhaps he was pushed by 
military necessity. Perhaps the initiative came from the Continental
5Ibid., 83-4.
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Congress. Perhaps the Congress and Washington had agreed that an 
official policy endorsing inoculation was essential to preserve the 
health of the Continental Army. That some consultation occurred is 
suggested by the resolution Congress adopted on February 12th, 1777: 
Ordered, That the Medical Committee write to General 
Washington, and consult him on the propriety and expediency 
of causing such of the troops in his army, as have not had 
the small pox, to be inoculated, and recommend that measure 
to him, if it can be done consistent with the public safety, 
and good of the service.
The decision to inoculate all Continental soldiers (including new 
recruits) and the consequent need to set aside hospital facilities for 
their proper care and treatment helped pave the way for a more formal 
structuring of the Medical Department. On February 27th, 1777, the 
Congress recommended the following plan for organizing three medical 
districts to cover the thirteen colonies:
The Medical Committee having taken into their 
consideration a plan for establishing Military Hospitals, 
[transmitted to Congress by General Washington] agree to 
report— -Section 1. That the Continent be divided into 
three districts. Ihe Middle to extend from Hudsons river to 
Potomac. The Southern to extend from Potomac to Georgia, 
and the Northern from Hudsons river to Quebec or Crown
Journals of the Continental Congress 1774-1789 (Washington: 
Government Printing Office, 1905), VII:110.
60
Point.^
General Washington’s own detailed plans for organizing the 
hospitals are described in his letter to Dr. John Cochran, sent from 
Morristown, N.J., on January 20th, 1777:
You are to proceed from hence [Morristown], to morrow, 
and there inquire into the state of the small pox and use 
every possible means in your power, to prevent that 
spreading in the Army and among the Inhabitants, which may 
otherwise prove fatal to the service; To that end you are to 
take such Houses, as will be convenient, in the most retired 
parts of the Country and best calculated to answer that 
purpose. You will then proceed to Philadelphia and consult 
Doctor Shippen the Director, about forming an Hospital for 
the ensuing Campaign, in such a manner, as that the Sick and
Wounded may be taken the best care of, and the
inconveniences in that Department, so much complain'd of, 
the last Campaign, may be remedied in future. You will 
also, in conjunction with Doctor Shippen, point out to me, 
in writing, such Officers and Stores, as you may think 
necessary for the arrangement of an Hospital, in every 
branch of the Department, as well to constitute one for an 
Army in the field, which may be stiled a flying Hospital; as
also, fixed Hospitals in such parts of the Country, as the
nature of the service from time to time may require. Let
7Ibid., 161-2.
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your standard be for 10,000 Men for one Campaign, and so in 
proportion for a greater or less number, as you may
o
hereafter be ordered.
In the overall organization chart that evolved, Dr. William
Shippen, Jr. continued in his post as "Director General of the
American Hospitals." Dr. John Cochran was confirmed as the "Physician
and Surgeon General of the Army in the Middle Dept." And on May 18th,
1776, the Congress "proceeded to the election of a director of the
Hospitals in Virginia; and the ballots being taken, William Rickman
was elected director and chief physician of the hospital in 
9
Virginia." When inoculation was adopted as Army policy, Alexandria 
was selected as the main site for an inoculation station and it became 
mandatory for all of the regiments coming up from the Southern 
colonies to pause at Alexandria for inoculation."^
There were, of course, other inoculation hospitals in the 
colonies but their records have not survived and little if anything is 
known of their operations. However, because of a number of serious 
complaints by Continental Army officers about Dr. Rickman and his 
performance (that led to his dismissal later on), and because some of 
these records have been preserved, it is possible to gain an 
insight into the day-to-day activities at the Alexandria inoculation 
hospital during a brief period in the year 1777. Between September
8Fitzpatrick, Writings of George Washington, 7_:44-5.
9
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22nd and November 30th (1777), 773 men were received into Dr.
Rickman's hospital stations ; 693 were discharged to duty; 21 died; 1 
was reported down; and 58 remained hospitalized."^
In an undated affidavit, Colonel John Wiliams of the 9th North
Carolina Regiment "declares that he thinks there was great neglect &
mismanagement of the Officers & Soldiers Inoculated for the smallpox
at Alexandria under the care of Doctr Rickman, that the men in general
complained of being neglected, the Director seldom appearing leaving
the business to his assistants...That he was called upon to view
these men who were in a misirable condition in a cold part of the
house without one blanket to cover them, in a little straw, that he
sent for Mr. Parker one of the assistant's, Doctor Rickman being in
the Country, who refused to attend, untill he was brought by Force,
who excused himself by saying that he did not know the men were in so
bad a situation.... there were about 300 inoculated out of whom 20
12died.
Another affidavit from Lieutenant John Crittenden, dated February 
26, 1778, tends to confirm Colonel Williams' account: "John
Crittenden Lieut in the 5th Virga Regiment being duly sworn deposeth & 
saith that he was informed by the Soldiers there was very little care 
and attention paid to them while under Inoculation for the Small pox 
at Alexandria; that he never saw Doctor Rickman in the Barracks where
"^Papers of the Continental Congress, 1774-1789 (Microcopy 247, 
Roll 101, Item No. 78), XIX:139.
12Ibid., (Roll 73. Item No. 59). 111:189.
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his men were sick, tho' he was absent on days when they were at the
worst, having been called to Williamsburg by Colo. Mason, & that he
understood but one dose of Physick was given to a man before he had
13the Small Pox & numbers had none afterward."
Jacob Walker, a Captain in the Continental Artillery, however,
submitted this dissenting opinion on January 20th, 1778: "I hereby
certifie that I was under the small pox under care of Doctor Rickman
at Alexandria and that during my continuance there which was I believe
near six weeks, as far as I was capable of judging, he paid the
strictest attention to the soldiers under his care in the small pox
that his constant custom was to visit the soldiers round every morning
and never failed either giving himself or sending Doctr. Dixon or
Parker when ever sent for to a sick soldier. As I lodged with Doctor
Rickman when I was at Alexandria his diligence necessarily came under
my observation. I remember once or twice he had left his bed when
called on by a soldier. Hie Doctor never that I remember was absent
two days together from Alexandria during my stay there. I was at
Alexandria in October and left in November. There were some Carolina
Troops and many new recruits for the Virginia Regiments then under the 
»1Asmall pox.
Anthony T. Dixon, an apothecary, confirmed the positive side of 
the testimony in his affidavit of February 7th, 1778: "I here by
Certify that Doctr Rickman attended the Carolina and Virginia Troops
13Ibid., (Roll 101. Item No. 78), XIX:119 
14Ibid., 107.
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that were Inoculated at Alexandria with the greatest care and 
diligence. That he prescribed medicines which I dispersed to them 
before and after the Smallpox. That I did not have an Officer or 
Soldier that suffered for want of his attendance nor did he absent 
himself from duty when his assistance was required neither did I ever 
hear any Complaint from Colonel Williams or any Other officer of 
neglect, and in my Opinion they had the attendance both by the
Director & his assistant--
These and other testimonials were duly forwarded to the 
Continental Congress: ’’Congress having received information that the
inoculation of recruits in the hospital in the State of Virginia has 
of late been attended with much ill success; Resolved, That the 
Medical Committee make strict enquiry into the truth of this
16information, and report to Congress with all possible despatch.’’
Ten days later, on December 20th, 1777, the Medical Committee decided 
that the detrimental evidence was sufficient to call for the dismissal 
of Dr. Rickman as director of the inoculation hospitals in Alexandria: 
The Medical Committee, to whom it was referred to 
enquire into the conduct of the director of the hospitals at 
Alexandria, reported, "That from the information of several 
officers in the Virginia and North Carolina regiments, which 
are annexed, it appears obvious to the committee that Dr.
Rickman, director of the said hospitals, has been guilty of
15Ibid., 113.
16Journals of the Continental Congress, IX:1016.
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great neglect in not giving proper attendance to the 
officers and soldiers under inoculation at Alexandria:"
The said report and the informations being read,
Resolved, That Dr. Rickman be immediately suspended, 
and that he attend the Medical Committee, to answer the 
several complaints exhibited against him.
Ordered, That the Medical Committee transmit to Dr.
Rickman a copy of the complaints against him, and direct his 
attendance.
That the said committee write to Dr. Shippen, director 
general, and direct him to send immediately a skilful 
physician to take care of the sick and superintend the 
inoculation of the soldiers at Alexandria."^
It required the combined (and occasionally the separate) efforts 
of both the Continental Congress and the Commander-in-Chief to keep 
the inoculation program on track. As can be seen from the Alexandria 
episode and the charges against Dr. Dr. Rickman, the Congress 
seriously examined the complaints of the officers and men under 
inoculation and it acted promptly to rectify any real or perceived 
wrongs. Throughout the critical years of 1777-8, when it was 
especially vital to rebuild the strength of the Continental Army and 
to boost its spirit and morale, General Washington used his authority 
to see to it that his inoculation orders were fully obeyed and 
properly executed. For example, his "General Orders" issued at Valley
17Ibid., 1039.
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Forge on March 18th, 1778, emphasized the importance of the 
inoculation procedures:
Inoculation for the Small Pox having been happily 
performed on all the subjects in Camp it is necessary to 
guard against the fatal effects of that disorder taken in 
the natural way. The Commander in Chief therefore enjoins 
all officers commanding Regiments upon the arrival of 
recruits or return of absent soldiers to make immediate and 
strict inquiry whether they have had the Small Pox, and 
order such as have not to be inoculated without loss of time 
by the Regimental Surgeon; and in case of the Regiments 
being unprovided with one to give instant notice to the 
Surgeon General.^®
Washington had travelled an arduous path from the aftermath of 
the Canadian disaster to the acceptance of smallpox inoculation as a
routine Army procedure. By June 17th, 1777, in a letter to General
Samuel Parsons from Middle Brook, N.J., he sounded very confident:
I have consulted, the Surgeon General upon the 
propriety of those of your Brigade coming on [from 
Peekskill, N.Y.] who have not had the small pox. He tells 
me that he does not apprehend the least danger, as there is
but one Woman in the whole Army who has it, and she will be
removed.^
18Fitzpatrick, Writings of George Washington, 11:107.
19Ibid., 8:258-9.
CONCLUSION
"May not those objections be easily done away [with], by introducing 
Inoculation into the State [of Virginia]?"
(George Washington to Governor Patrick 
Henry of Virginia, April 13, 1777.)
Fig. 2 is a copy of the "RETURN of the SICK and WOUNDED in the 
AMERICAN MILITARY HOSPITAL at Danbury [Connecticut] Eastern Department 
FROM October 20th TO November 7th 1778" which lists the most common 
"DISORDERS" that afflicted and immobilized soldiers and qualified them 
for hospitalization and medical treatment. Many of the names of the 
illnesses and diseases are familiar. Others are not. The one thing, 
however, that all of these sicknesses had in common was that nobody in 
America during the Revolutionary War knew what caused them or how to 
cure them. The drugs and herbs and occasional bloodlettings 
prescribed by the doctors for their patients were little better than 
folk medicine. More often than not, the prescriptions were worse than 
the disorders. Consequently, the casualties caused by these 
infectious diseases far exceeded battlefield wounds.
Dr. James Thatcher, a surgeon in the Continental Army throughout 
the Revolutionary War and one of the most astute and reliable 
contemporary medical observers of the entire conflict (from 1775 to
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1783), "estimated the total deaths in the war as 70,000 As the
period of active hostilities covered seven years, 1775-1781 inclusive,
Dr. Thatcher's estimate gives a mortality [rate] of 10,000 per 
2
year." Colonel Louis Duncan, a twentieth-century military medical 
authority, adds his own personal observation to the effect "that ten 
men died of disease to every one whose life was taken by the enemy is
3
a safe estimate." Snallpox accounted for a good many of these
deaths. Exactly how many, it is impossible to say. According to Dr.
Hugh Thursfield (in his 1940 article, "Smallpox in the American War of
Independence"), "it is on record that the deaths from the natural
[smallpox] disease exceeded 16 per cent and that the mortality from
the inoculated disease, when proper control was exercised, averaged
but one in three hundred, and that many regiments of five hundred men
4
were inoculated without a single loss."
As this thesis has pointed out, General Washington, in January of 
1777, finally took the necessary action to bring to an end the 
inoculation controversy in the Continental Army. His mandatory 
inoculation policy effectively served to cleanse the Army of the
2
Louis C. Duncan, Medical Men in the American Revolution 1775 - 
1783 (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: Medical Field Services School, 1931), 
370.
3Ibid., 371.
4
Hugh Thursfield, "Smallpox in the American War of 
Independence." Annals of Medical History II 3rd Series 
(1940):316-7.
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smallpox virus. It was not solely a military decision; it had 
apparently become an emotional issue with the General as well. The
extent of the involvement of his personal feelings are perhaps best
captured in the following lines which he wrote to Lieutenant Colonel 
Robert Harrison from Morristown, N.J., on January 20th, 1777:
I beg of you to consult, and in my name advise and
direct such measures as shall appear most effectual to stop 
the progress of the Small pox; when I recall to mind the 
unhappy situation of our Northern Army last year I shudder at 
the consequences of the disorder if some vigorous steps are 
not taken to stop the spreading of it.^
Even after the issuance of his mandatory inoculation order, 
Washington continued to cajole, scold, and plead with his officers and 
medical personnel (in a stream of memoranda and directives) to 
practice what today would be called preventive medicine, inoculation 
and quarantine, in maintaining the health of his soldiers. Nor did 
Washington spare the civilian sector once he had made up his mind to 
promote actively a pro-inoculation campaign for the Continental Army. 
Referring to the anti-inoculation statute in Virginia that was still 
on the books, Washington wrote to his brother, John Augustine 
(Washington), in June of 1777:
Surely that Impolitic Act, restraining Inoculation in 
Virginia, can never be continued. If I was a Member of that
^John C. Fitzpatrick, ed., The Writings of George Washington 
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1932), 7j38.
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Assembly, I would rather move for a Law to compell the 
Masters of Families to inoculate every Childbom within a 
limited time under severe Penalties.
He had used essentially the same argument (again referring to the 
Virginia anti-inoculation statute) when addressing Governor Patrick 
Henry of Virginia on April 13th, 1777, while upbraiding the Governor 
for the lagging enlistment quotas from his State:
The apologies you offer for your deficiency of Troops, 
are not without some Weight; I am induced to believe, that 
the apprehensions of the Small pox and its calamitous 
consequences, have greatly retarded the Inlistments; but may 
not these objections be easily done away [with], by 
introducing Inoculation into the State, or shall we adhere 
to a regulation preventing it, reprobated at this time, not 
only by the Consent and usage of the greater part of the 
civilized World, but by our Interest and own experience of 
its utility? You will pardon my observations on the Small 
pox, because I know it is more destructive to an Army in the 
Natural way, than the Enemy's Sword, and because I shudder, 
when ever I reflect upon the difficulties of keeping it out, 
and that, in the vicissitudes of War, the scene may be 
transferred to some Southern State.^
In summary, the virtual elimination of the smallpox threat to the
6Ibid., 8:158. 
7Ibid., 7:409.
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Continental Amy after 1777 was indeed the outstanding medical success 
story of the entire period of the Revolutionary War. Thanks to 
inoculation, the Amy was saved from the one disease (of all those 
listed in Fig. 2) that could have seriously immobilized it and perhaps 
even have destroyed it.
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